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In The Penalty Default Canon,' Kim Krawiec and Scott Baker borrow
principles from contract law that are designed to resolve issues arising out of
incomplete agreements to propose a provocative solution for resolving ambi-
guity in some statutes. They analogize an ambiguous statute to a contract in
which parties fail to specify certain fundamental terms, thereby imposing on
the courts the cost of determining the agreement reached. When parties
leave a contract unspecified intentionally to transfer the costs of resolving the
uncertainty, they note, the courts void the contract, refusing to recognize that
an agreement was reached as a penalty for the parties attempting to impose
these costs on the courts. By analogy, Professors Krawiec and Baker propose
that courts declare a statutory provision unconstitutional when Congress has
purposely left the provision ambiguous to avoid political responsibility that
might attach to resolving the ambiguity. Such congressional action, they rea-
son, is analogous to parties to a contract leaving the agreement unspecified in
order to transfer the costs of resolving the uncertainty. Because the resulting
ambiguity is left for either the judiciary or the executive branch to resolve,
Krawiec and Baker suggest that the legislation should be held to violate the
nondelegation doctrine, which the Supreme Court used on two occasions in
1935 to declare provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act unconsti-
tutional for giving the executive branch too little guidance for implementing
these provisions.2
The "Penalty Default Canon" is not just some harebrained scheme that
two legal academics have concocted by borrowing from a discipline they
know well to suggest remedies in an area of law that is less familiar to them.
The article provides a very clear description of the literature on the patholo-
gies of the federal legislative process that may cause Congress to delegate
responsibility for completing legislative deals in order to avoid accountability
for the ultimate deal struck. Krawiec and Baker demonstrate that they fully
understand not only the contract law literature from which they borrow, but
also the legal and political science literature about how the legislative process
works. The article also evidences that the authors thought long and hard
* Patricia A. Dore Professor of Administrative Law, The Florida State University College
of Law. Thanks to Kim Krawiec and Scott Baker for graciously encouraging me to write this
response, and to my colleagues Greg Mitchell and Jim Rossi for comments on earlier drafts.
1 Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 663 (2004).
2 See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935); Panama
Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935).
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about the ramifications of their proposal, and they have crafted it to mini-
mize its use in situations where they believe statutory invalidation is not war-
ranted and to avoid strategic use of their proposal by the legislative and
judicial actors who ultimately determine what statutes will meet their criteria
for invalidation. It is because their article is so well done that I think it war-
rants a response to point out some fundamental normative assumptions
about our political system that the authors make along the way and with
which I disagree.
There are many controversial aspects to the proposal in The Penalty De-
fault Canon. For example, the article not only proposes reviving the mori-
bund nondelegation doctrine, but it also would extend that doctrine in an
unprecedented manner by utilizing it where Congress has essentially dele-
gated to the courts the responsibility for filling in statutory gaps or resolving
ambiguities. In addition, any analysis that depends on reading legislative his-
tory to find the motive of a multibody group like Congress is going to raise
difficult questions about what it means for a group to have a motive3 and
precisely how the courts are to determine what that motive is. 4 Yet, I think
that objections on these grounds are answered by the authors who recognize
that their proposal goes beyond advocating application of constitutional doc-
trines as they currently exist and who painstakingly take care to avoid the
worst pitfalls of having the judiciary use legislative history to determine Con-
gress's motive. They recognize that such a proposal has the potential to em-
power the Court to impose its own policy preferences in striking down
legislation as strategically motivated delegations.5 They point out, however,
that they propose a precise and rigorous test for when a statute should be
struck down, and that their test replaces doctrines that would allow the courts
less guided and monitorable criteria for resolving legislative ambiguities. 6 In
short, they argue that it will be more difficult for the Court to abuse its role
as interpreter and applier of law by substituting its policy preferences for
3 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 68 (1994); Frank H. Easterbrook, Some Tasks in Understanding
Law Through the Lens of Public Choice, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 284, 284 (1992); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 17 HARV. L. REV. 802, 828 n.57 (1982); John F.
Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional Adjudication, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1340-41 (1998); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV.
863, 870 (1930).
4 Assuming that there is a meaningful legislative intent to be discerned, there are two
remaining thorny questions posed by the use of legislative history. First, is it appropriate to rely
on language that was never enacted into law? See Manning, supra note 3, at 1345 (stating that
"[flor textualists, legislative history is uniquely problematic because it permits legislators to cre-
ate their own context, and thus to influence the details of meaning outside the process of bicam-
eralism and presentment" (emphasis added)). Second, is legislative history a reliable source for
discerning congressional intent? See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTER-
PRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 29-37 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
5 See Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 775 (1999); Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False Promise of the
"New" Nondelegation Doctrine, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 17-18 (2000).
6 Baker & Krawiec, supra note 1, at 667-69.
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those of the legislature under their proposal than under existing law.7 This
response does not focus on these most obvious potential criticisms, against
which I think Krawiec and Baker have defended their proposal well.
My critique focuses instead on the implicit assumptions Krawiec and
Baker make about the benefits of forcing the legislature to make the impact
of its legislative decisions more transparent to the polity and the costs of
surreptitiously delegating the ultimate political choices to administrative
agencies or the courts. Let me first clarify that it is unclear why Krawiec and
Baker attribute benefits to a more transparent legislative process, but I can
postulate two possibilities. First, they may believe that making the process
more transparent will make the ultimate outcome better in the sense of being
more in accord with the preferences of the polity as a whole. If this is their
belief, they are essentially optimistic that their suggested legal prerequisites
for legislation to be valid can force Congress to adopt statutes that reflect
some notion of the public interest. In essence, such a belief would, at least in
certain circumstances, comport with the position of the pluralists. Pluralists
liken the legislative process to a competitive market that leads to an equilib-
rium outcome that maximizes some version of political wealth, taking into
account that each individual has one vote and reflects both the preferences of
each voter and the strengths of those preferences. 8 The authors, however,
explicitly disavow that they adopt an interest group version of law-making
and hence suggest that they do not ascribe to the pluralists' optimism that the
legislative process will reach a welfare-enhancing equilibrium. 9 Therefore, I
am left with the alternative that they do not care about outcomes of the pro-
cess, but value transparency for its own sake, perhaps because our constitu-
tional system envisions that the legislature will be accountable to a fully
informed citizenry. To put another perhaps more sympathetic spin on this
alternative, the authors may take the position that there is no way to evaluate
whether one outcome is better than another, or whether one is closer to some
notion of the public interest than another, because we have no measure of
goodness-no definition of the public interest. For them, by definition, the
optimal outcome is that which results from a legislative process that is ac-
countable to an informed electorate. It is thus not surprising that they pay no
attention to the relative ability of the courts and agencies compared to Con-
7 Id.
8 See ANTHONY DowNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 36-38 (1957); MARTIN
SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? 5-6 (1988). This optimistic view of politics corre-
sponds to the political science conception of pluralism espoused by Robert Dahl and David
Truman. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALISTIC DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CON-
FLICT AND CONSENT 23-24 (1967); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 512-16
(1951). It also loosely corresponds with the pluralism of Gary Becker, who posits that interest
groups invest actual dollars until the marginal return on their investment is zero, and therefore
concludes that the resulting economic equilibrium is actually wealth maximizing. Gary S.
Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON.
371, 394-96 (1983).
9 Baker & Krawiec, supra note 1, at 668, 669-71; William C. Mitchell & Michael C. Mun-
ger, Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey, 35 AM. J. POL. Sci. 512,
532-35 (1991) (describing Becker's model as concluding that the legislative process will be wel-
fare enhancing, but criticizing the model for assuming that all interest groups participate on all
issues on an equal footing).
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gress to fill statutory gaps in a manner that best accords with the desires of
the polity. It also follows from the authors' lack of concern about outcomes
that just as they are inherently or perhaps tautologically optimistic about
Congress's ability to fulfill the desires of the public, they are implicitly pessi-
mistic about the abilities of the courts and agencies to do so. This response
will attempt to show that, regardless of which belief underlies Krawiec and
Baker's proposal, in most cases, the invalidation of statutes that they propose
will ultimately lead to outcomes that are less in accord with the desires of the
polity-farther from the "public interest"-even if one cannot precisely de-
fine or measure that concept.
My position thus assumes it is sensible to talk about the public interest.10
I do not define the public interest precisely, although ultimately I conceive
the public interest as deriving from the fulfillment of the preferences of a
fully informed polity in a context that encourages consideration of the exper-
iences and interests of others." Although that fuzzy definition provides no
operational measure by which to determine which of several outcomes better
serves the public interest, as the remainder of this response makes clear, I
believe one can argue that certain outcomes clearly fall far outside the public
interest even without providing a precise operational measure.
Why Delegation of Policy Disputes Will Lead to Better Outcomes
than Congressional Resolution
Professors Krawiec and Baker describe three mechanisms that explain
why Congress might delegate to avoid responsibility for choosing statutory
prescriptions. The first, attributable to Aronson, Gellhorn, and Robinson,
focuses on legislators' motives to take credit for providing regulatory benefits
to a diffuse class of stakeholders-in short, the public-without having to
accept blame for imposing regulations on more focused interest groups-usu-
ally groups representing regulated industries. 12 Congress can achieve this
"best of both worlds" by delegating the responsibility for adopting imple-
menting regulations and by using language that suggests that the putative
10 Contrary to my good friend and colleague Rob Atkinson, who claims to know me better
than I know myself, I am thus a "little p," not a "big P," proceduralist. See Rob Atkinson, The
Reformed Welfare State as the Radical Humanist Republic: An Enthusiastic (if Qualified) En-
dorsement of Matthew Adler's Beyond Efficiency and Procedure, 28 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 339,
341-42 (2000).
11 See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Gov-
ernment, 100 HARv. L. REV. 4, 32 (1986) (defining the common ground necessary for the devel-
opment of a conception of the public good); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification
for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1528 (1992). Although I do not provide an
operational measure for determining what outcomes are in the public interest, I suspect that
such a measure may well be some variant on wealth maximization that takes into account distri-
butional and moral concerns. Cf Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Bene-
fit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1111 (2000) (arguing that
cost-benefit analysis adjusted to take care of distorted preferences, together with "deontological
[and] egalitarian considerations," should determine whether the government should act or main-
tain the status quo).
12 Peter H. Aronson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delega-
tion, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 61 (1982).
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beneficiaries have gained a legislative victory. At the same time, the focused
nature of the regulated entities' interest and the fact that these entities are
repeat players who retain control over much information on which regulation
depends renders them better able to monitor and influence the agency imple-
mentation and enforcement of the statutory scheme than the public. As a
result, the apparent victory for the diffuse stakeholders is illusory. The regu-
lated entities, being savvy, understand this, while the public, being more na-
ive, does not. By some accounts, this is the story of major environmental
statutes such as the Clean Water and Clean Air Acts.' 3
Krawiec and Baker next describe an alternative mechanism, recently
proposed by Epstein and O'Halloran, according to which Congress seeks to
avoid public blame for regulatory failures in contexts where there is little
political gain that accrues from successful implementation of a regulatory
scheme and great political loss from failed implementation. 14 By delegating,
Congress transfers the potential for blame to an agency or the courts, but
foregoes little political benefit. Epstein and O'Halloran support their theory
with numerous examples, including regulation of airline safety.15 If there are
several plane crashes after the regulatory scheme is implemented, the institu-
tion that adopted the regulatory provisions stands to take significant political
heat. 16 If there are no crashes, however, the public is unlikely to attribute
this to the success of any statute or regulation.1 7 The industry will blame
Congress for any costs that regulation imposes on it.18 Hence, Congress can
avoid potential criticism by delegating to an agency the responsibility for
adopting regulation, again in a context where the agency is unlikely to im-
pose undue costs on the industry.
Krawiec and Baker add to the existing theories of responsibility-avoid-
ing delegations by positing a third mechanism-really a variant on the other
two-in which the interest of diffuse stakeholders coincides with the interests
of some focused and therefore sophisticated interest group. 19 In other words,
under this alternative, there are sophisticated interest groups on either side
of the underlying policy debate. An example of a delegation that might re-
sult from such a dynamic is workplace health and safety regulation. On one
side is industry, which will oppose having to bear the costs of regulation. On
the other side are workers and unions, the latter of which are focused interest
groups capable of accurately assessing the likely impact of the legislative del-
egation. Labor union leaders, however, may have an incentive not to report
accurately to the rank and file their assessment of the true impact of regula-
tion-that it will do little for workers-because they might be better able to
13 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal
Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 313-14, 323-30 (1991) (noting that while
Congress has often called for far-reaching environmental regulation through legislation such as
the Clean Water and Clean Air Acts, it has also consistently failed to provide the Environmental
Protection Agency with the funding necessary to achieve the goals set out by these laws).
14 DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS 9-13 (1999).




19 Baker & Krawiec, supra note 1, at 674.
[Vol. 72:724
Pyrrhic Political Penalties
maintain interest in unions, and in turn support for their own leadership, by
characterizing the resulting delegation as a victory for workers. 20 Addition-
ally, labor leaders might support the delegation because it maintains their
role in resolving the statutory ambiguity, thus creating a need for labor to
keep them as leaders.2 '
My critique of Krawiec and Baker's proposal does not depend on which
of these mechanisms is responsible for a given delegation. What is crucial to
my critique, however, is that under any of these mechanisms, Congress dele-
gates in reaction to the political influence of competing stakeholders who
would like to push the regulatory outcome to opposite extremes. Environ-
mentalists lobby Congress to force industry to maximize the resources it
spends on cleaning and maintaining the environment, while industry lobbies
Congress to allow it to devote minimal resources to environmental efforts.
The airline industry wants to be free from regulation it considers burdensome
and unnecessary to protect the safety of air traffic, while Congress will feel
pressured to impose maximal safety regulations by the likely public reaction
to any crash that occurs after Congress determines a safety standard. Indus-
try seeks to avoid having to spend money on workplace safety, while unions
desire that Congress mandate such spending. By delegating, Congress can
avoid the seemingly necessary political costs that would result from disap-
pointing one or both of the relevant stakeholders by resolving the battle be-
tween them. In any of the three situations described above, the outcome that
best accords with the public interest most likely falls somewhere in between
the positions of the competing stakeholders. There are benefits to be gained
by regulation, but beyond some point-even taking distribution and morality
into account-those benefits will not justify the costs of more onerous regula-
tion.22 Unfortunately, there are several reasons to believe that if Congress is
forced to resolve the conflict itself, it will not mandate an outcome that
comes anywhere close to the optimal compromise. Instead, agencies and
courts are more apt to do so if Congress delegates the resolution of the con-
flict to them.
20 See Daniel J. Gifford, Redefining the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 72 MINN. L. REV.
1379, 1413 (1988) ("Union managers may have incentives of their own, which conflict with the
interests of the majority: to maintain large membership rolls to enhance their own power and
prestige as leaders of a large organization and maintain or increase union revenues from dues-
paying members."); Bruce A. Herzfelder & Elizabeth E. Schriever, The Union Judgment Rule,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 980, 980 (1987) ("[U]nion leaders might advance interests of their own rather
than interests of the union's rank and file.").
21 For a description of how the structure and dynamics of interest groups allow leaders'
interests to deviate from those of the membership, see Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakehold-
ers: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411,
429-39 (2000).
22 For example, it is generally agreed that at some point the value of environmental pro-
tection is outweighed by its cost, although there is great debate about whether our current regu-
latory scheme is close to that point. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER, Eco-PRAGMATIsM 3-4, 6-8
(1999); Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The
Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 23, 65 (1996)
(stating that zero pollution is an invalid goal); James L. Huffman, Either You're With Us or
Against Us: No Room for the Skeptical Environmentalist, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 391, 399
(2002) (stating that the traditional environmentalist call for zero pollution is not defensible).
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One reason to distrust the ability of Congress to reach optimal legislative
compromise is the irrationality of voters. As evidenced by some of the refer-
enda that have passed in various states, voters do not seem to take into ac-
count the costs of regulation. 23 In other words, voters are not satisfied with
the explanation that they only get part of what they desire because total im-
plementation would be too expensive. If such referenda are any indication, it
is likely that members of the general public would blame Congress for any
unsatisfactory statutory outcome.
Focused interest groups can also act irrationally in their demands for
legislative outcomes, albeit for different reasons. Psychologists have identi-
fied heuristics by which individuals make decisions that are biased in the
sense that they can lead to decision-making that deviates from an individual's
outcome preferences in predictable ways. One such problematic heuristic is
the confirmation bias.24 According to the psychology of decision-making,
once a decision-maker commits to an outcome, she will look for confirming
evidence and tend to ignore evidence that undercuts the wisdom of that out-
come. 25 Even if presented with undermining evidence, the decision maker
will discount its importance to the choices she faces. 26 A group leader is thus
apt to conclude that the optimal outcome of any legislative debate will be
closer to her group's desired outcome than it actually is. It may be that the
confirmation bias can be overcome by the presentation of undermining evi-
dence in a context that requires the decision-maker to reflect on the discon-
firming information, but the legislative process is not geared toward such
deliberative reflection. 27 In addition, even if a group leader accurately as-
sesses the optimal outcome, she may still object to a legislative choice of that
outcome because of another heuristic bias-overconfidence. Individuals
tend to be overly optimistic about their abilities.28 If a group leader considers
litigation or the administrative process as an alternative to a legislative reso-
23 Those with which I am most familiar come from Florida, where voters have amended
the state constitution to require the state to provide for a bullet train in the state, which will cost
at least $2 billion. See Scott Powers, Track Cost Could Sack Greeneway Route Expressway;
Agency's Demands Complicate Train's Bumpy Path, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 18, 2003, at B1,
2003 WL 70492478. In addition, Florida voters have placed caps on the size of classes in elemen-
tary, middle, and high schools, that may cost the state as much as $27 billion. Bill Cotterell, Bush
Takes Aim at Initiatives: Governor Warns of Costs of Class Size, Bullet Train Amendments, TAL-
LAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Mar. 5, 2003, at 8, 2003 WL 2562733. Governor Jeb Bush has begun a
process to repeal this initiative. Id. Because of these voter initiatives, the Governor has also
begun seeking to amend the state constitution to make initiatives harder to adopt and to require
that initiatives on the ballot be accompanied by a statement of their costs. Id.
24 Stefan Schulz-Hardt et al., Biased Information Search in Group Decision Making, 78 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 655, 655 (2000).
25 See Dieter Frey, Recent Research on Selective Exposure to Information, in ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 41, 42 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1986); Schulz-Hardt et al.,
supra note 24, at 658.
26 See Frey, supra note 25, at 44; David M. Sanbonmatsu et al., Overestimating Causality:
Attributional Effects of Confirmatory Processing, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 892, 893
(1993).
27 See Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 1544-45.
28 See Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47
ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146-47 (1981) (reporting that drivers tend to view themselves as
more skillful than their records actually reflect).
[Vol. 72:724
Pyrrhic Political Penalties
lution, she is more likely to be dissatisfied with the resolution that the legisla-
ture reaches. This is true even though the resolution may represent what she
believes to be the socially optimal outcome because she believes that she
could convince the court or agency to reach a more satisfactory outcome than
the outcome that they probably would reach.2 9 Therefore, even when inter-
est groups are on both sides of a legislative issue, they may be dissatisfied
with a compromise outcome that comes close to the socially optimal
resolution.
Under the Penalty Default Canon, Congress thus faces a situation in
which it must anger one side or the other, and in which a compromise that
imposes an outcome close to that which is socially optimal is likely to incur
the wrath of both sides. Faced with such a choice, legislators are likely just to
determine which side can most help or hurt their political careers-which
group is more likely to raise the probability that they may not be elected-
and will resolve the ambiguity in favor of that group.30 If courts and agencies
were not likely to produce a better resolution, the propensity of Congress not
to work out the optimal resolution would not matter. But both courts and
agencies are more shielded from direct political pressures.
Federal judges and the heads of independent agencies do not have to
worry that they will lose their jobs if they upset a powerful interest group.31
Heads of executive branch agencies may worry about the prospect of losing
their jobs based on decisions they make, but the risks of such losses are sig-
nificantly decreased because firing an agency head is a politically salient
29 See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439,
443 (1993) (reporting that almost all newlyweds expect that they will not get divorced despite
knowing that the divorce rate is fifty percent); Jeffrey J. Rachlinsky, The Uncertain Psychological
Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1165, 1172-73 (2003) (describing the overoptimism bias
and distinguishing it from other self-serving biases); Svenson, supra note 28, at 145-46 (finding
that eighty-six percent of drivers report that they are safer than average behind the wheel). The
overconfidence bias has been used to explain why litigants proceed to trial rather than settling a
case despite the fact that trials are extremely expensive. See Samuel Issacharoff & George
Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 111-12 (1990).
The same dynamic would explain why an interest group leader might prefer to take a chance on
having a court or agency interpret an ambiguous statutory provision rather than agree to a cer-
tain legislative resolution of the ambiguity.
30 Legislative compromise becomes more probable when there are several issues on the
table and legislators can engage in the practice of "logrolling" or trading votes. Logrolling al-
lows legislators to reveal their relative preferences for various outcomes and reach a Pareto-
optimal legislative outcome. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 82-86 (1989). If, how-
ever, interest groups pressure legislators only on issues about which they have a strong interest,
essentially ignoring the small costs imposed on their members by the multitude of other interests
that the legislator considers, logrolling will merely facilitate legislators granting the most influen-
tial group with respect to an issue its desired outcome on that issue in return for allowing their
opponents a victory on a different issue. This may avoid delegations, but leads to focused inter-
est groups gaining desired outcomes on most matters, to the detriment of the general public.
31 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (stating that judges "shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour" and their compensation "shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Of-
fice"); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) (allowing Congress to limit the president's
power to remove an officer of the United States when doing so will not "impede the President's
ability to perform his constitutional duty").
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event that usually imposes costs on the president. 32 In addition, courts and
agencies must explain their decisions based on factors other than pure polit-
ics-courts must do so to maintain their institutional legitimacy and agencies
must do so to pass judicial review.33 At least with respect to agencies, this
helps insulate the agency from being unduly influenced by partisan politics
because explanations require that the agency staff develop data and analyses
to support any agency decision, and the staff responsible for doing so are
protected against being fired by the civil service system. 34 The requirement
of explanation also tends to induce deliberation among staff members with
different perspectives on the controversy,35 which in turn militates a prefer-
ence-maximizing determination. 36
In fact, agency outcomes are capable of resisting even strong political
pressure if the agency has the data and analysis to support its decision. For
example, the Reagan White House, in response to pressure from the petro-
leum industry, demanded that the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") repeal a rule phasing out lead in gasoline, but the White House had
to back down from this demand and even allow the EPA to strengthen the
rule in the face of evidence demonstrating that the benefits of the rule signifi-
cantly outweighed the costs. 37 In most cases, smart agency heads recognize
that their decision must accommodate strong preferences of the White House
and the congressional majority, but data and analyses still provide a spring-
board for the agency to avoid the extreme outcomes to which the political
process is likely to lead. David Kessler, head of the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration ("FDA"), was thus able to regulate cigarettes as drug delivery devices
32 See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 666-67 & n.402 (1984).
33 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (stating
the Supreme Court's legitimacy depends on public perceptions of its fitness to determine the
meaning of the nation's laws); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?: Judicial Impartiality
and the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REV. 606, 610 (2002) (asserting that "[p]ublic
confidence is essential to upholding the legitimacy of the judiciary").
34 Cf David B. Spence, Managing Delegation Ex-Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative
Agencies, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 413 (1999) (reporting that in the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission's ("FERC") hydroelectric licensing decisions, the agency "appears to have resisted
political control, sometimes successfully," but not giving reasons for FERC's ability to resist).
The ability of agency staff to restrict the outcomes of an agency's decision is sufficiently great
that the White House even has, on occasion, feared agency head "capture" by staff. See JAMES
Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY THEY Do IT 50
(1989) (noting Nixon's fears that bureaucrats hired by democratic administrations would under-
mine his policies); J. Clarence Davies, Environmental Institutions and the Reagan Administration,
in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1980s: REAGAN'S NEW AGENDA 144 (Norman J. Vig &
Michael E. Kraft eds., 1984) (reporting on Reagan's mistrust of agency career civil servants);
Maureen Dowd, Who's Environment Czar, E.P.A.'s Chief or Sununu?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15,
1990, at Al, B16 (describing the George H. W. Bush administration's "distrust of the E.P.A.
bureaucrats").
35 See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 528 (2002).
36 Cf. David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State,
89 GEO. L.J. 97, 110 (2000) (arguing that agencies are more likely than the legislature to be able
to discern the preferences of the fully informed median voter).
37 See THOMAS 0. McGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 31-44 (1991).
[Vol. 72:724
Pyrrhic Political Penalties
despite no initial support from the White House and strong opposition from a
Congress fearful of incurring the wrath of the tobacco industry by carefully
developing a record showing that cigarette manufacturers purposely manipu-
lated nicotine levels to hook new smokers. 3
There is also a good chance that by attempting to force Congress to re-
solve conflicts rather than delegate, the Penalty Default Canon would simply
induce inaction by Congress. As already noted, any action by Congress is
likely to engender blame.39 Inaction has the benefit of not attracting atten-
tion, thereby avoiding blame.40 Alternatively, Congress might delegate none-
theless, knowing that the courts will strike its deal under the Penalty Default
Canon, because that would allow Congress to transfer the blame for the lack
of resolution of the conflict to the courts. In most situations, maintaining the
status quo will be farther from the outcome that best satisfies voter prefer-
ences than a resolution that gives a victory to one side or the other. To un-
derstand why, note that even when Congress enacts a statute that leaves
significant policy issues unresolved, the statute typically demands a change in
the status quo.41 In other words, even if Congress leaves a huge range from
which an agency or court can choose the meaning of the statute, that range
usually will not include the state of the law that existed prior to passage of
the statute. This demand essentially reflects a consensus for a change in the
status quo in the direction in which the statute points, although consensus
may not exist as to the extent of the change. If the Court strikes the ambigu-
ous provision in that context, then the resulting outcome will not reflect this
consensus and hence will most likely fall farther from the optimal outcome
than will most choices in the range that Congress had made available to the
court or agency. Moreover, because of legislative inertia42 and the ability of
38 DAVID KESSLER, A MATTER OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A
DEADLY INDUSTRY 254-57 (2001). The FDA's regulation of cigarettes ultimately was struck
down by the Supreme Court, which found the regulations were beyond the FDA's power under
its authorizing statute. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000).
But the tobacco industry's reputation was severely tarnished and it no longer enjoys the political
influence it once did in large part because of the information the agency uncovered while prepar-
ing to adopt the regulations.
39 See supra notes 12-29 and accompanying text.
40 See supra notes 12-29 and accompanying text.
41 In both examples for which Krawiec and Baker conclude that the Penalty Default Ca-
non justifies invalidating a statutory provision, they indicate that the provision added uncertainty
but that the legal status quo was within the range that Congress left open to the courts. Baker &
Krawiec, supra note 1, at 670-71 (demonstrating that the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act left open the possibility of applying the pleading standard used in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, which itself was uncertain); id. at 698-705 (showing that Con-
gress believed that section 6 of the Clayton Act would not change the prevailing judicial inter-
pretation). In such cases, striking the provision does not lead to alarming outcomes because the
results are the same as if it were construed as Congress intended. As I describe below, the
alarming nature of the remedy Krawiec and Baker suggest becomes apparent when the ambigu-
ous provision nonetheless was clearly intended to alter the status quo. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 44-49.
42 See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency
Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 482 (1999) ("Legislative inertia and the gatekeeping function
of congressional committees can prevent Congress from responding even when there is a general
consensus on the need for legislative action.").
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Congress to blame the Court for any problems that ensue from striking the
statute, Congress may never enact a new provision reflecting the desire to
alter the status quo.43
For example, the provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
("OSHA") requiring promulgation of workplace exposure limits to toxic and
harmful substances instruct that "[t]he Secretary [of Labor] ... shall set the
standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis
of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impair-
ment of health." 44 The statute was ambiguous because it did not define the
meaning of "feasible" or the effect of the language "on the best available
evidence. ' 45 The American Petroleum Institute argued that Congress had
intended that the Secretary use cost-benefit criteria in setting standards; con-
versely, the AFL-CIO asserted that Congress had intended that standards for
substances with no known safe levels of exposure be set at the lowest expo-
sure limits that industry could afford and remain viable.46 In determining the
meaning of this statute, a majority of the Supreme Court characterized the
discretion inherent in the language as giving the Secretary unprecedented
power over American industry and, but for a saving construction by refer-
ence to another section of the Act, would have found that the language gov-
erning the criteria for personal exposure limits violated the nondelegation
doctrine.47 Justice Rehnquist even voted to declare the statute unconstitu-
tional because Congress intentionally avoided deciding the issue of whether
the Secretary could set exposure limits that would bring industry to the brink
of solvency.48 Krawiec and Baker found insufficient evidence to conclude
that Congress was motivated to punt on this issue by the desire to avoid polit-
ical responsibility,49 but their conclusion may merely reflect a lack of suffi-
cient evidence of this motive in the legislative history. With a slightly
different set of statements in that history, Krawiec and Baker could well have
concluded that OSHA's provisions governing exposure limits to toxic sub-
stances should have been found an unconstitutional delegation under the
Penalty Default Canon. Had the Court struck the provision, the result would
have been that industry would not have had to comply with any toxic sub-
stance exposure limits, even those limits that were cost justified. This choice
43 See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 605 (1995) (arguing that Congress is apt to leave in place
resolutions of issues by the courts with which most legislators disagree rather than risk the politi-
cal costs and spend the time to reverse them); Maxwell L. Stearns, A Beautiful Mend: A Game
Theoretical Analysis of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 134
(2003) (noting that congressional inertia is likely to leave in place forever judicial determinations
under the dormant commerce clause).
44 Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2000).
45 Id.
46 Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639 (1980).
47 Id. at 646.
48 Id. at 682, 687-88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
49 Apparently, Krawiec and Baker sought to apply their canon to this case, but were una-
ble to conclude that Congress's delegation of how burdensome on industry occupational safety
and health standards should be was motivated by a desire to avoid responsibility for the choice.
Interview with Kimberly D. Krawiec, Visiting Professor, The Florida State University College of
Law, in Tallahassee, Fla. (Jan. 22, 2004).
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was one that the statute would preclude no matter how it was interpreted
and, therefore, seems presumptively to fall farther from the outcome that
maximizes voter preferences than any of the outcomes within the range from
which Congress left the agency to choose.
My final argument against striking delegations that avoid accountability
is that such delegations, at least to agencies, may provide benefits that make
the delegation valuable. 50 As Krawiec and Baker recognize, agencies often
enjoy advantages over the legislature in resolving policy debates. 51 Agencies
often have greater expertise about a policy issue than legislative staff.52
Agencies may enjoy lower transaction costs in resolving a debate because
they can generate necessary information and perform the evaluation needed
to reach a resolution more cheaply than can the legislature.53 Agencies also
enjoy greater flexibility in how to implement any resolution of the debate,
which can allow the agency to react more quickly and easily to new informa-
tion or changes in circumstances that warrant reconsideration of an initial
resolution.54 To these I would add the potential for preference shaping via
the administrative process that allows for greater satisfaction than the plural-
ist legislative process, which does not provide meaningful mechanisms for
50 I refrain from applying this argument to delegations to courts because (1) judges do not,
as a general matter, have expertise on matters of policy; (2) the judicial process does not have
efficient procedures for gathering legislative and transscientific facts-the kinds of information
necessary to resolve policy disputes; (3) courts decide cases based on law, including precedent,
and must wait for parties to bring a dispute to them and hence are reactive and do not have the
flexibility to easily modify or reconsider prior determinations; and (4) the adversarial process by
which parties participate in judicial determinations is not well suited to reflective consideration
of an adversary's position and hence the judicial process is not conducive to preference shaping.
See Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 1543-44. Note that in both cases in which Krawiec and Baker
find invocation of the Penalty Default Canon appropriate, the delegation was to the courts and
not administrative agencies. See Baker & Krawiec, supra note 1, at 690-706.
51 See Baker & Krawiec, supra note 1, at 707 n.236 (characterizing delegations as welfare
enhancing because of lack of congressional expertise, flexibility to respond to changing circum-
stances, and reduced transactions costs of legislating more precisely).
52 See Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 1544-45, 1549.
53 Id. at 1544-48.
54 Agencies can choose to resolve the issue by a synoptic approach, characterized by
rulemaking, see Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 393, 396-97 (1981) (describing the synoptic mode of policy setting), by muddling through,
see Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 80-88
(1959) (describing an incremental mode of making policy he labeled "muddling through"), or by
using case-by-case adjudication to flesh out the appropriate policy outcome, see SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (holding that the decision whether to adopt policy via rulemaking
or adjudication is left to an agency's discretion); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294
(1974) (same, but also holding that the decision is reviewable for abuse of discretion). Agencies
can even resolve policy debates by issuing guidance documents-interpretive rules or statements
of general agency policy-that allow agencies to announce universally applicable outcomes that
they can easily change if circumstances so warrant. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000) (excepting inter-
pretive rules from notice-and-comment procedures). The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, however, has construed what otherwise appeared to be gui-
dance documents as legislative in nature, thereby restricting agencies' ability to rely on these
highly flexible devices for implementing policy. See Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the
Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV.
803, 807 (2001) (criticizing the D.C. Circuit's doctrine with respect to guidance documents).
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each side to try to understand the position of its rivals.55 In short, delegating
to an administrative agency may make it possible for the regulatory system to
reach outcomes that simply could not be attained by any legislative resolu-
tion and thereby increases the likelihood that the ultimate outcome better
reflects the interest of the public. Krawiec and Baker recognize this, and for
this reason they explicitly structure their test to avoid striking statutes where
Congress has delegated to take advantage of such benefits. The mere fact
that Congress did not delegate because of such advantages, however, does
not render the outcome any less valuable. In response, Krawiec and Baker
might contend that if Congress wants a delegation that creates such advan-
tages to pass muster under their test, all it has to do is rely on these advan-
tages in explaining its delegation in the legislative history and avoid
mentioning the concomitant benefit to legislators that the delegation will
shield them from political responsibility. Like any doctrine that depends on
legislative motive, however, Krawiec and Baker's test is not perfect. It goes
so far as striking down delegations even where Congress does rely on agency
advantages in resolving a policy debate if the legislative history seems to indi-
cate that Congress was more motivated by avoiding political responsibility.56
Conclusion
Kim Krawiec and Scott Baker have proposed a provocative new formu-
lation of the nondelegation doctrine that would have courts strike down stat-
utory delegations motivated by Congress's desire to avoid responsibility for
resolving policy disputes. Krawiec and Baker, skeptical of any method for
evaluating the desirability of a policy outcome, posit that the outcome of the
legislative process when Congress is not motivated by a desire to hide politi-
cal responsibility is presumptively good. This response questions that pre-
sumption. Because of the insulation of courts and agencies from direct
political pressure, and the deliberative capacity of those institutions, I con-
clude that they will reach outcomes preferable to those likely to come out of
the legislature in those situations where Congress delegates to avoid political
responsibility.
55 See Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 1545 & n.167.
56 Baker & Krawiec, supra note 1, at 685 n.110 (noting that in cases where individual
legislators may have been motivated by both legitimate reasons for delegation and to avoid
political responsibility, courts will have to determine which was the primary motivation of the
majority of legislators in the enacting coalition or of key "veto players" in passage of the
statute).
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